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ABSTRACT
Content based image retrieval (CBIR) is a technique to search
for images relevant to the user’s query from an image collec-
tion. In last decade, most attention has been paid to improve
the retrieval performance. However, there is no significant
effort to investigate the security concerning in CBIR. Under
the query by example (QBE) paradigm, the user supplies an
image as a query and the system returns a set of retrieved re-
sults. If the query image includes user’s private information,
an untrusted server provider of CBIR may distribute it ille-
gally, which leads to the user’s right problem. In this paper,
we propose an interactive watermarking protocol to address
this problem. A watermark is inserted into the query image by
the user in encrypted domain without knowing the exact con-
tent. The server provider of CBIR will get the watermarked
query image and uses it to perform image retrieval. In case
where the user finds an unauthorized copy, a watermark in
the unauthorized copy will be used as evidence to prove that
the user’s legal right is infringed by the server provider.
Index Terms— Content based image retrieval, water-
marking protocol, user’s right problem
1. INTRODUCTION
Content based image retrieval (CBIR) is a technique to search
for images relevant to the user’s query from an image collec-
tion. In CBIR, the content of an image is normally character-
ized by visual features, such as, color, texture and shape. Un-
der the query by example (QBE) paradigm, the user supplies
an image as a query and all images in the image collection are
ranked in accordance with their similarity to the user’s query.
Then the top k images will be returned and displayed to the
user. In last decade, most attention has been paid to improve
the retrieval performance of CBIR system [1, 2]. However,
there is only a few effort to investigate the security concerning
in CBIR. Fleck et.al demonstrated a content-based retrieval
strategy to tell whether there are naked people present in an
image [3]. Li proposed a security mechanism for CBIR in
which hierarchical queries with different authorization on a
large image collection are implemented based on digital wa-
termark [4]. Actually, with the popularity of information re-
trieval in ordinary users, the security concerning, especially
the user’s right, is becoming more and more obvious, which
motivates the work presented in this paper.
Normally the user’s right is ignored in CBIR. There two
implicit assumptions shared by most existing CBIR schemes:
(1) a query does not includes any user’s private informa-
tion which should not be distributed illegally; (2) the server
providers of CBIR are always trustworthy who do not col-
lect the users’ information and use it without authorization.
However, these are not always true in practical applications
of CBIR. If a user’s query image should be protected, an
unfaithful server provider of CBIR may distribute it without
authorization, which will lead to the user’s right problem. For
example, in medical applications, a medical image is used
as a query [5] which including the user’s health information
should not be distributed without authorization. In another
case, an artist may use an unpublished creation as a query
to search similar images but the unauthorized copies of the
query image are forbidden.
To address the user’s right problem, we propose an in-
teractive watermarking protocol. This idea comes from the
digital watermark based copy deterrence [6, 7, 8, 9], which
embeds a distinct watermark in each copy of the multimedia
data. Later, if unauthorized copies are found, the origin of
the copy can be determined by retrieving the unique water-
mark corresponding to each buyer. This discourages unau-
thorized duplication and distribution. The recent work show
that a watermarking protocol is necessary to achieve secure
copy deterrence [7, 8, 9]. In our watermarking protocol, an
invisible watermark is inserted into the query image by the
user in encrypted domain without knowing the exact content.
The server provider of CBIR will get the watermarked query
image and uses it to perform image retrieval. In case where
the user finds an unauthorized copy, a watermark in the unau-
thorized copy will be used as evidence to prove that the user’s
legal right is infringed by the server provider. The security
analysis demonstrates that the proposed watermarking proto-
col can protect the user’s right effectively.
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Fig. 1. Interactions among the server provider of CBIR, the
user, and the watermark certification authority.
Fig. 2. Details of the interactions
2. WATERMARKING PROTOCOL
In the practical applications of CBIR, an ordinary user may
have two different requirements. In one case, the user sup-
plies a common image as the query and only cares about the
retrieval results. In the other case, the user supplies a private
image as the query and the content of the query image should
be protected. The former case has been addressed by most
existing CBIR schemes [1, 2]. In this paper, we focus on the
later case and propose an interactive watermarking protocol
to protect the user’s right. The proposed watermarking proto-
col comprises of two sub-protocols: protection protocol and
arbitration protocol.
2.1. Protection protocol
In the protection protocol, the interaction occurs among the
user (U), the server provider of CBIR (SP) and the watermark
certification authority (WCA). U is an ordinary user who sup-
plies an image as the query and gets the retrieval results from
SP. SP is the server provider who manages the CBIR sys-
tem. In this paper, SP is untrusted who may distribute the
user’s query image without authorization. WCA is a trusted
watermark certification authority who is in charge of issuing
the valid watermarks. Fig.1 shows the secure image retrieval
model with user’s right protection and Fig.2 visualizes the de-
tails of the following steps.
1. To protect copyright of his query image, U sends
CertCA(pkSP ), ARG,X to WCA and requests a
valid watermark. CertCA(pkSP ) is a common dig-
ital certification of SP which is issued by the trusted
certification authority (CA) and publicly available on
the SP’s website [10]. ARG is a common agreement
signed by U which is also publicly available and ex-
plicitly states the rights and obligations of both parties,
particularly including that the user’s query must not be
distributed without authorization.
2. When WCA receives CertCA(pkSP ), ARG and X ,
it verifies the validity of the certificate, and aborts the
transaction if it is invalid. Otherwise, it generates a
watermark W specific to this transaction. Since X
is also transmitted to WCA, it is possible for WCA
to create a more robust watermark according to the
characteristics of X . After W is successfully gener-
ated, WCA computes EpkSP (W ), EpkWCA (W ) and
SignWCA (EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , ARG). The
signature SignWCA (EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , ARG)
binds W and ARG, which is used to avoid the unbind-
ing problem [9]. After that, WCA sends these data
back to U.
3. Upon receiving the response, U performs the water-
mark insertion in the encrypted domain by comput-
ing EpkSP
(
X¯
)
= EpkSP (X ⊕W ) = EpkSP (X) ⊕
EpkSP (W ), without knowing the actual watermark,
W . Note that ⊕ is an watermark insertion operation
and EpkSP is privacy homomorphic with respect to ⊕.
For example, the well-known RSA cryptosystem [11]
is a privacy homomorphism with respect to multipli-
cation. The Paillier public key cryptosystem [12] is
also a privacy homomorphism with respect to addition.
Afterwards, U sends EpkSP
(
X¯
)
and ARG to SP to
request retrieval results. Then, U stores all information,
CertCA(pkSP ), EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , X,ARG,
SignWCA (EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , ARG). These
data is to against possible unauthorized distribution of
the private query image.
4. After receiving EpkSP
(
X¯
)
and ARG, SP decrypts it
with skSP by computing X¯ = DskSP
(
EpkSP
(
X¯
))
and searches for the images relevant to X¯ in its image
collection or Internet. Then SP returns the retrieval re-
sults RR to U. The retrieval results can be plain text
like that in the practical information retrieval applica-
tions. According to ARG, SP should not distribute X¯
without authorization.
At last, U receives the retrieval results and this transaction is
closed.
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2.2. Arbitration protocol
The arbitration protocol is designed for resolving the dispute
between U and SP. When an unauthorized copy Y of a certain
digital contentX is found, the arbitration protocol can be used
to trace the pirate responsible and gather undeniable evidence.
In this paper, we consider that U knows who creates the unau-
thorized copy since it only sends X¯ to one SP for requesting
retrieval results. U first collects the evidence information,
CertCA(pkSP ), SignWCA (EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , ARG),
EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , X,ARG, and sends them along
with Y to an arbitrator (ARB).
Upon receivingCertCA(pkSP ), EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) ,
X, Y, SignWCA (EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , ARG), ARB
verifies the validity of the certificate and the signature. If any
of them is invalid, he rejects the case. Otherwise, ARB sends
EpkWCA (W ) to the WCA and asks the WCA to decrypt it.
After getting W , ARB runs the corresponding watermark de-
tection and extraction algorithm (with X,Y and W as inputs)
to determine the existence of W in Y . If W is indeed found
in Y , ARB turns to the CA and asks for the real identity
behind pkSP . Once the identity of the SP who owns pkSP is
revealed, ARB judges the SP to be guilty and closes the case.
If W is not detected in Y , the SP is considered innocent.
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we examine the security of the proposed
watermarking protocol. Three key problems are explored:
the user’s right problem, the unbinding problem and the
anonymity of users.
• The user’s right problem. As mentioned above, in
the practical applications of CBIR an untrusted server
provider may distribute the user’s private query image
without authorization. Our watermarking protocol is
proposed to solve this problem. On the one hand, SP
is unable to remove the watermark W since it has only
the watermarked query image X¯ without the knowl-
edge of the original image X and the watermark W .
Once an unauthorized copy is found, U can get enough
evidence to prove that it is distributed by SP without
authorization. On the other hand, U can not fabricate
piracy to frame SP since the watermark insertion is
performed in encrypted domain and U has no idea of
the watermark W and the watermarked query image
X¯ . The arbitration mechanism in the protocol can dis-
courage the unauthorized distribution, which provides
a way to protect the user’s right.
• The unbinding problem. In a buyer-seller watermark-
ing protocol, this problem means that a dishonest
seller may transplant a watermark embedded in a pi-
rated copy into a copy of higher-priced digital con-
tent to fabricate piracy [9]. In the context of CBIR,
this problem changes to that a dishonest user may
transplant a watermark embedded in a pirated copy
into a copy of higher-priced digital content to fab-
ricate piracy. This problem does not exist in our
proposed watermarking protocol since the signature
SignWCA (EpkSP (W ) , EpkWCA (W ) , ARG) explic-
itly binds W to ARG, which uniquely specifies a
particular query image X . It is impossible for U to
transplant the watermark into a copy of higher-priced
digital content.
• The anonymity of users. It is optional for a buyer to
keep its identification anonymous in a buyer-seller wa-
termarking protocol. An approach based on anony-
mous digital certification is proposed in [9]. However
in CBIR, the anonymity of users is necessary and most
ordinary users have no digital certification. In the pro-
posed watermarking protocol, the user can keep anony-
mous who does not need to provide the digital certifi-
cate issued by trusted certification authorities. In the
protection protocol, U needs to perform the watermark
insertion in the encrypted domain in which the pub-
lic key of SP is necessary. U can get other informa-
tion from SP’s website or WCA. No information on the
identification of U is necessary in this stage. In the ar-
bitration protocol, U just needs to send all evidence in-
formation to ARB in which no information about its
identification involved. So the anonymity of the user is
retained in the whole transaction.
4. DISCUSSION
The watermarking protocol is proposed to protect the user’s
right in the practical applications of content based image re-
trieval. The related work is a family of buyer-seller water-
marking protocol [7, 8, 9, 10]. The proposed watermarking
protocol and conventional watermarking protocol are differ-
ent since they are applied in different applications for differ-
ent purposes. Although we focus on content based image re-
trieval in this paper, the user’s right problem also exists in
other media retrieval, such as audio and video, if they apply
QBE paradigm. And the proposed watermarking protocol is
also suitable to content based audio retrieval or content based
video retrieval.
In the protection protocol the underlying watermarking
scheme is not required to be linear. That is, we do not re-
quire the computation of the watermark insertion to be per-
formed on an element-by-element basis [8]. As long as pri-
vacy homomorphism is preserved, any kind of watermarking
schemes, including those that do not tolerate the permutation
of watermarks, can be adopted [9]. Furthermore, WCA has
the original query image X , it can create a more robust wa-
termark. With only one watermark the quality of X¯ can be
promised, so the retrieval performance will not be affected by
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the watermark. In the arbitration protocol, the assistance of
SP is not necessary. If an unauthorized copy is found, U can
collect all evidence information and sends them to ARB.With
the assistance of WCA, ARB can determine if SP should take
charge of this pirated copy. The character is much useful in
practical applications of CBIR.
In the proposed watermarking protocol, the trusted third
parties, CA and WCA, can be memoryless. CA takes charge
of issuing common digital certification. When later asked by
ARB to reveal the real identity behind a certain certificate,
CA simply decrypts the data item stored in the extension field
of the certificate and derives the real identity. WCA also does
not need to remember anything. Once a watermark is gen-
erated, it is encrypted with SP’s public key and handed over
to U. When requested by ARB to disclose a specific water-
mark, WCA just decrypts the ciphertext provided by ARB.
The server provider of CBIR (SP) can be memoryless too.
Upon receiving a request for image retrieval, SP decrypts the
ciphertext from U to get the watermarked query image and
performs image retrieval. Then SP returns the retrieval results
to U and has nothing to remember. For user’s right protection,
U has to store necessary information. It is reasonable because
in real-world the accuser, U, should provide enough evidence
to prove that the accused SP has distributed the copies of a
certain digital content without authorization.
5. CONCLUSIONS
With the explosively growing amount of information made
available in digital form, the information retrieval plays a
more and more important role in our work and daily life.
Most researches focus on improving the retrieval performance
and few efforts have been paid to the security problems of re-
trieval systems. In this paper, we concentrated on the security
problems of content based image retrieval (CBIR). We found
most conventional CBIR schemes suffer from the user’s right
problem. Under the query by example (QBE) paradigm, the
user supplies an image as a query and the system returns a set
of retrieved results. If the query image includes user’s private
information, an unfaithful server provider of CBIR may dis-
tribute it illegally. We proposed an interactive watermarking
protocol to address this problem. In case where the user finds
an unauthorized copy, a watermark in the unauthorized copy
will be used as evidence to prove that the user’s legal right is
infringed by the server provider. So the user’s right can be
protected. It should be pointed out that the user’s right prob-
lem also exist in other media retrieval systems, such as audio
and video, if they apply QBE paradigm. And the proposed
watermarking protocol is also suitable to content based audio
retrieval or content based video retrieval. In the future, more
attacks and risk analysis will be explored. The content based
watermarking techniques and image retrieval techniques will
be seamlessly combined to improve the effectiveness of the
user’s right protection.
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